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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT
COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
____________________________________________X
In the Matter of the Application of
ROBERT SMITH, #80-A-1942,
Petitioner,
for Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules

DECISION AND JUDGMENT
RJI #16-1-2012-0415.100
INDEX # 2012-897
ORI #NY016015J

-againstBRIAN FISCHER, Commissioner,
NYS Corrections and Community Supervision,
and ANDREA EVANS, Chairwoman, NYS
Board of Parole,

Respondents.
____________________________________________X
This is a proceeding for judgment pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR that was
originated by the Petition of Robert Smith, verified on August 28, 2012 and filed in the
Franklin County Clerk’s office on October 2, 2012. Petitioner, who is an inmate at the
Franklin Correctional Facility, is challenging the February, 2012 determination denying
him parole and directing he be held for an additional 24 months. An Order to Show Cause
was issued on October 4, 2012. The Court has since received and reviewed respondents’
Answer, including Confidential Exhibits C and E, verified on November 20, 2012 and
supported by the November 20, 2012 Affirmation of Keith A. Muse, Esq., Assistant
Attorney General. The Court has also received and reviewed petitioner’s Reply thereto,
sworn to on December 11, 2012 and filed in the Franklin County Clerk’s office on
December 18, 2012.
On June 23, 1980 petitioner was sentenced in Supreme Court, Bronx County, to
an indeterminate sentence of 21 years to life upon his conviction of the crime of Murder
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2°. After having been denied discretionary parole release on at least six previous
occasions, petitioner made his seventh appearance before a Parole Board on February 8,
2012. Following that appearance a decision was rendered again denying petitioner parole
and directing that he be held for an additional 24 months.

The parole denial

determination reads as follows:
“AFTER A CAREFUL REVIEW OF YOUR RECORD, A PERSONAL
INTERVIEW, AND DELIBERATION, PAROLE IS DENIED. YOUR
INSTITUTIONAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND RELEASE PLANS ARE
NOTED. REQUIRED STATUTORY FACTORS HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED,
INCLUDING YOUR RISK TO THE COMMUNITY, REHABILITATION
EFFORTS, AND YOUR NEEDS FOR SUCCESSFUL REINTEGRATION
INTO THE COMMUNITY. THIS PANEL REMAINS CONCERNED,
HOWEVER, ABOUT THE SERIOUS AND VIOLENT NATURE OF THE
INSTANT OFFENSE OF MURDER 2ND, WHICH, WHEN CONSIDERED
WITH REQUIRED AND RELEVANT FACTORS, LEADS TO THE
CONCLUSION, THAT IF RELEASED AT THIS TIME, THERE IS A
REASONABLE PROBABILITY THAT YOU WOULD NOT LIVE AND
REMAIN AT LIBERTY WITHOUT VIOLATING THE LAW, AND YOUR
RELEASE AT THIS TIME IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE WELFARE AND
SAFETY OF THE COMMUNITY.”
The document perfecting petitioner’s administrative appeal from the parole denial
determination was received by the DOCCS Parole Appeals Unit on March 13, 2012.
Although the Appeals Unit failed to issue its findings and recommendation within the 4month time frame set forth in 9 NYCRR §8006.4(c), a belated decision on administrative
appeal was, in fact, issued on or about October 4, 2012, after the commencement of this
proceeding. Petitioner’s argument to the contrary notwithstanding, the failure of the
Appeals Unit to timely issue its findings and recommendation does not serve to invalidate
the underlying parole denial determination. See Rosario v. New York State Division of
Parole, 80 AD3d 1030 and Graham v. New York State Division of Parole, 269 AD2d 628,
lv den 95 NY2d 753. The sole consequence of such failure is to allow the petitioner to
deem his administrative remedies to have been exhausted and immediately seek judicial
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review of the underlying determination without an exhaustion defense being raised. See
9 NYCRR §8006.4(c).
Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A), as amended by L 2011, ch 62, part C , subpart A,
§§38-f and 38-f-1, effective March 31, 2011, provides, in relevant part, as follows:
“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as a reward for
good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after
considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is
released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and
that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not
so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the
law. In making the parole release decision, the procedures adopted
pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred fifty-nine-c of this
article shall require that the following be considered: (i) the institutional
record including program goals and accomplishments, academic
achievements, vocational education, training or work assignments, therapy
and interactions with staff and inmates . . .(iii) release plans including
community resources, employment, education and training and support
services available to the inmate . . . (vii) the seriousness of the offense with
due consideration to the type of sentence, length of sentence and
recommendations of the sentencing court, the district attorney, the attorney
for the inmate, the presentence probation report as well as consideration of
any mitigating and aggravating factors, and activities following arrest prior
to confinement; and (viii) prior criminal record, including the nature and
pattern of offenses, adjustment to any previous probation or parole
supervision and institutional confinement . . .”
Discretionary parole release determinations are statutorily deemed to be judicial
functions which are not reviewable if done in accordance with law (Executive Law §259i(5) unless there has been a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety. See Silmon
v. Travis, 95 NY2d 470, Vasquez v. Dennison, 28 AD3d 908, Webb v. Travis, 26 AD3d
614 and Coombs v. New York State Division of Parole, 25 AD3d 1051. Unless the
petitioner makes a “convincing demonstration to the contrary” the Court must presume
that the New York State Board of Parole acted properly in accordance with statutory
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requirements. See Nankervis v. Dennison, 30 AD3d 521, Zane v. New York State
Division of Parole, 231 AD2d 848 and Mc Lain v. Division of Parole, 204 AD2d 456.
In this proceeding petitioner asserts, in effect, that there was no evidence
supporting the Board’s conclusion that if he were released there would be a reasonable
probability he would not live and remain at liberty without violating the law and that such
release would be incompatible with the welfare and safety of the community. In this
regard petitioner alleges that he was very young (26 years old) at the time the underlying
crime was committed and that he “ . . .still maintain[s] his innocence and feel[s] remorse
. . .” Petitioner also asserts that he served “ . . . 33 years plus with no criminal record, an
excellent institutional adjustment, exemplary behavioral record and more than
satisfactory release plans, and completion of all therapeutic programs as well as all other
mandated and recommended programs . . .” According to petitioner, the parole denial
determination was flawed in that it focused solely on the seriousness of the underlying
crime.
A Parole Board need not assign equal weight to each statutory factor it is required
to consider in connection with a discretionary parole determination, nor is it required to
expressly discuss each of those factors in its written decision. See Martin v. New York
State Division of Parole, 47 AD3d 1152, Porter v. Dennison, 33 AD3d 1147 and Baez v.
Dennison, 25 AD3d 1052, lv den 6 NY3d 713. As noted by the Appellate Division, Third
Department, the role of a court reviewing a parole denial determination “. . . is not to
assess whether the Board gave the proper weight to the relevant factors, but only whether
the Board followed the statutory guidelines and rendered a determination that is
supported, and not contradicted, by the facts in the record. Nor could we effectively
review the Board’s weighing process, given that it is not required to state each factor that

4 of 6

[* 5]

it considers, weigh each factor equally or grant parole as a reward for exemplary
institutional behavior.” Comfort v. New York State Division of Parole, 68 AD3d 1295,
1296 (citations omitted).
In the case at bar, reviews of the Inmate Status Report and transcript of the
February 8, 2012 Parole Board appearance reveal that the Board had before it information
with

respect

to

the

appropriate statutory factors including

therapeutic/vocational programming,

petitioner’s

academic achievements, release plans and

favorable disciplinary record, in addition to the disturbing nature of the violent crime
underlying his incarceration and prior criminal record.1 See Zhang v. Travis, 10 AD3d
828. The Court finds, moreover, nothing in the parole appearance transcript to suggest
that the Board cut short petitioner’s discussion of any relevant factor or otherwise
prevented him from expressing clear and complete responses to its inquiries. Indeed,
before closing the record of the parole interview Commissioner Hagler asked the
petitioner if there was “ . . . anything we have not discussed here that you want to put here
on the record.” In response to that open-ended invitation petitioner responded as follows:
“I can’t change my past, but I can change my future and, you know, I’m deeply regretful

1

The Court notes the particularly brutal and bizarre circumstances associated with the crime
underlying petitioner’s incarceration. As set forth on page two of the Inmate Status Report prepared in
anticipation of petitioner’s February 2012 Board appearance (Exhibit D annexed to respondents’ Answer),
“[t]he instant offense is described as the inmate causing the death of the victim by repeatedly striking her
in the head with a hammer . . . The inmate is also reported to have been engaged in anal intercourse with
the victim as she lay dead or dying.” W hen questioned during the Parole Board appearance as to the
accuracy of such description, petitioner was unable to confirm or deny the details. According to petitioner
he had been drinking/taking pills at the time of the incident and “ . . . basically blacked out.” The Court also
notes that petitioner’s assertions that he led a “law-abiding life” prior to committing this crime (Paragraph
14 of the Petition) and that he had no prior criminal record (Paragraph 17 of the Petition) are belied by the
record before the Parole Board. Petitioner’s Criminal History printout, annexed to the Inmate Status Report
prepared in anticipation of petitioner’s initial April 2000 Parole Board appearance and annexed to the
respondents’ Answer as part of Exhibit D thereof, reveals multiple criminal convictions during the 1970's
prior to the 1980 Murder 2° conviction.
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what happened to my family, her family. You know, I feel very bad about this. I’ve been
holding it in a lot of years. I just want to let this out.”
In view of the above, the Court finds no basis to conclude that the Parole Board
failed to consider the relevant statutory factors. See McAllister v. New York State
Division of Parole 78 AD3d 1413, lv den 16 NY3d 707, and Davis v. Lemons, 73 AD3d
1354. Since the requisite statutory factors were considered, and given the narrow scope
of judicial review of discretionary parole denial determinations, the Court finds no basis
to conclude that the denial determination in this case was affected by irrationality
bordering on impropriety as a result of the emphasis placed by the Board on the of the
crime underlying petitioner’s incarceration. See Veras v. New York State Division of
Parole, 56 AD3d 878, Garofolo v. Dennison, 53 AD3d 734, Serrano v. Dennison, 46 AD3d
1002, Schettino v. New York State Division of Parole, 45 AD3d 1086 and Farid v. Travis,
17 AD3d 754, app dis 5 NY3d 782.
Finally, to the extent petitioner asserts in his Reply that this matter should be
transferred to the Appellate Division for disposition of the “substantial evidence” issue,
the Court finds that parole denial determinations are not subject to judicial review under
the substantial evidence standard. See Tatta v. Dennison, 26 AD3d 663 and Valderrama
v. Travis, 19 AD3d 904.
Based upon all of the above, it is, therefore, the decision of the Court and it is
hereby
ADJUDGED, that the petition is dismissed.
Dated:

February 4, 2013 at
Indian Lake, New York.

__________________________
S. Peter Feldstein
Acting Supreme Court Justice
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